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The ‘Resource Curse’ literature often links a boom in commodity exports 
with appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate as a result of an in! ux of 
foreign exchange. This leads to a loss of international competitiveness and 
hampers diversi" cation of the economy. So adopting the right exchange-rate 
regime is extremely important for commodity-exporting countries. 
The real exchange rate is determined by both the relative value of currencies and 
relative prices. If the exchange rate is allowed to freely ! oat, the greater supply of 
foreign exchange from an export boom will appreciate the domestic currency in 
nominal terms as its value rises relative to that of foreign currency. 
If the exchange rate is " xed, the central bank is obliged to sell domestic currency 
in return for foreign exchange. This will increase the supply of domestic currency, 
which will boost domestic demand for goods and services and drive up their 
prices. This will cause real appreciation since the ratio of domestic prices to 
foreign prices will rise.
The relevance of the exchange rate regime
Hence, central banks confront a ‘trade-o# ’ between nominal appreciation 
if they allow ! exible exchange rates and domestic in! ation if they maintain 
" xed exchange rates. But in both instances the ultimate result is the same: an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, whether through a change in the relative 
values of currencies or the ratio of domestic to international prices. 
Economists who favour in! ation-targeting recommend ! exible exchange rates 
because they would be more conductive, they argue, to domestic price stability. 
However, we prioritise exchange-rate management as a more e# ective tool to 
combat commodity-induced appreciation. 
One reason is that the link between the money supply and domestic prices is 
often weak because of extensive excess capacity in developing countries. Since 
under-used factors, such as labour, will be mobilised to increase production 
when aggregate demand increases, prices will tend to remain stable.
Another reason is that food prices account for a large share of the Consumer 
Price Index. And they are heavily in! uenced by supply conditions. So an increase 
in domestic demand for food, because of an increased money supply, might not 
signi" cantly a# ect the CPI.
Exchange rate management of the copper boom 
The recent copper boom in Zambia provides a concrete basis to evaluate
exchange-rate regimes. The Zambia boom elicited an in! ux of foreign 
exchange that, together with speculative capital in! ows and debt relief, sharply 
appreciated the Kwacha, " rst in November 2005 and then during mid-2007 to 
mid-2008 (see " gure). 
However, because the Bank of Zambia was committed to using foreign exchange 
interventions only to smooth volatility in the exchange rate, it did not undertake 
any concerted e# orts to counteract the appreciation, especially during the 
sharp upturn of 2005.  As a result, Zambia’s non-traditional exporters of tobacco, 
cotton, co# ee and horticulture experienced a 30 per cent decrease in their
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earnings in domestic currency terms, and thus contracted their production in 
2006-2007. This drop in production had dramatic consequences for employment 
since these sectors accounted for almost 70 per cent of the total workforce while 
the copper mines accounted for only 10 per cent. 
The Impact on In! ation
What could have happened if the Bank of Zambia had managed the exchange 
rate? What would have been the respective impact on in! ation of the money 
supply and the exchange rate,? What would have been this impact both in the 
short run and the long term?
To test these hypotheses, we utilised a cointegrated Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) 
model for both food and non-food prices during the period 1994-2008. This 
disaggregation of prices is important because food prices account for almost 70 
per cent of Zambia’s CPI. 
We found that in the short run the CPI was not very responsive to changes in 
either the money supply or the exchange rate. Food in! ation, though sensitive 
to the exchange rate in the long run, adjusted mainly to its own previous values 
in the short run. Moreover, though non-food in! ation was sensitive to changes 
in the money supply in the short run, it generated only modest in! ationary 
pressures because it did not account for a large share of the CPI. 
Under these conditions, we argue that the Central Bank could have opted for 
managing the exchange rate since this could have forestalled a real appreciation 
without having had a major impact on domestic prices. 
Our research tends to support the general proposition that in developing 
countries such as Zambia, a managed exchange rate could prove to be an 
e# ective tool for safeguarding international competitiveness without inducing 
excessive in! ationary pressures in the domestic economy.
Reference:
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* A lower value of the exchange rate denotes an appreciation
Source: IMF-IFS
Copper prices and nominal exchange rate*
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
20
00
m
01
20
01
m
01
20
02
m
01
20
03
m
01
20
04
m
01
20
05
m
01
20
06
m
01
20
07
m
01
20
08
m
01
K
w
a
ch
e
 p
e
r 
U
S
$
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
U
S
$
 p
e
r 
m
e
tr
ic
 t
o
n
s
